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1. INTRODUCTION: EU-LISTCO’S FRAMEWORK IN A NUTSHELL 
EU-LISTCO starts from the assumption that Europe’s internal and external 
environment is characterized by two risk factors, which represent challenges for the 
external action of the EU and its member states:1 
• Areas of limited statehood (ALS), in which central government authorities and 
institutions are too weak to set and enforce rules and/or do not control the 
monopoly over the means of violence. Such areas of limited statehood are 
ubiquitous. They characterise large parts of the regions surrounding the EU in the 
East and in the South. However, areas of limited statehood are neither ungoverned 
nor ungovernable. Some ALS are reasonably well governed by a whole variety of 
actors – state and non-state, domestic/local and international, while others are not. 
The challenge for EU foreign policy is to foster good governance in areas of limited 
statehood. 
• Contested orders (CO), in which state and non-state actors challenge the norms, 
principles, and rules according to which societies and political systems are or 
should be organised. At the global and regional level, powers such as Russia and – 
somewhat less aggressive – China call the liberal and law-based order into 
question. The Trump administration in the United States adds a new dimension to 
order contestations by appearing to turn away from the liberal international order 
which the U.S. itself was instrumental in creating. Finally, and domestically, 
Western and non-Western societies struggle with the rise of actors that question 
their current political and legal order from the inside as well as from the outside. 
The challenge for EU foreign policy is to foster conditions in which order 
contestations remain peaceful and do not contribute to governance breakdowns 
in areas of limited statehood. 
Neither limited statehood nor contested orders will go away. They create 
vulnerabilities and pose risks, but they do not in themselves amount to threats to the 
EU. Only if and when areas of limited statehood and contested orders deteriorate into 
governance breakdowns and violent conflict, do the risks turn into threats to the 
security and stability of the EU, its member states, and citizens. The main research 
task of EU-LISTCO is to investigate the “tipping points” at which risks of limited 
                                                          
1  We thank our EU-LISTCO partners for very valuable and detailed input to this paper, particularly during the 
discussions at the EU-LISTCO kick-off conference in Berlin, April 25-27, 2018. Special thanks go to Riccardo 
Alcaro, Pol Barguès-Pedreny, Federica Bicchi, Sarah Bressan, David Cadier, Stephen Krasner, Christian 
Lesquesne, Pol Morillas, Havard Mokleiv Nygard, Saime Ozcurumez, Philipp Rotmann, Eric Stollenwerk, and 
Marcin Terlikowski. For research assistance, we thank Anna Schmauder and Amelie Buchwald. 
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statehood and contested orders turn into threats leading to governance breakdowns 
and violent conflict. 
Two factors are decisive in affecting such tipping points: 
• Global, diffuse, and regional risks, such as nuclear proliferation, transnational 
terrorism, economic crises, aggressive powers, cyber threats, and climate change, 
are likely to promote governance breakdowns and violent conflict in areas of 
limited statehood and contested orders. 
• Resilience is likely to help societies to sustain good and effective governance at the 
local/domestic as well as regional levels. We understand resilience as the “capacity 
of societies, communities and individuals to manage opportunities and risks in a 
peaceful and stable manner, and to build, maintain or restore livelihoods in the 
face of major pressures.” (European Commission & High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2017, 3). 
In other words, the various risks, on the one hand, and resilience, on the other, affect 
tipping points in opposite ways. Whether or not risks turn into threats for European 
security then depends on the extent to which resilient societies can successfully 
contain these risks through effective and legitimate governance at the local, domestic, 
and regional levels.   
Last but not least, we use three indicators to measure degrees of resilience: 
• Social trust in societies and local communities; 
• Legitimacy (or social acceptance) of governance actors and institutions at the 
various levels; 
• Institutional design of local, domestic, and regional governance arrangements 
including what is left of central state institutions. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual framework of EU-LISTCO. Research in EU-
LISTCO – particularly Work Packages 2, 3, and 4 – will focus on exploring the 
relationships between the various factors outlined above which affect the tipping 
points between risks and threats. The remainder of this paper introduces the various 
concepts used in the framework in more detail, namely areas of limited statehood, 
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Figure 1: EU-LISTCO’s Conceptual Framework 
 
Source: Authors’ own illustration. 
 
2. EUROPE’S RISKS: AREAS OF LIMITED STATEHOOD AND 
CONTESTED ORDERS 
2.1 Statehood: Functional vs. Institutional Understandings 
Theories of the state abound (see e.g. Benz, 2001; Hay, Lister, & Marsh, 2006; Hobson, 
2000; Schuppert, 2009; vom Hau, 2015).2 Most scholars would probably agree that the 
state constitutes a particular type of political order, a political system, or a polity. A 
tribe forms a political order, but it is not a state. Global governance, with its many 
international institutions, also constitutes a political order, but there is no world state. 
So, how do we know a state when we see it? Two conceptualizations of the state in the 
literature help us clarify the concept of statehood. 
Functional conceptualizations of the state focus on the functions it is supposed to 
perform. Such a performance-based approach defines functioning states as 
essentially service providers – from security to education and a clean environment. 
This functional understanding of the state has informed most of the scholarly 
literature on ‘fragile’ and ‘failed’ states, the various datasets measuring degrees of 
statehood, as well as the state-building programs of development agencies and 
                                                          
2  The following draws on Börzel & Risse, forthcoming, ch. 2. 
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international organizations (e.g. Rotberg, 2003, 2004; Schneckener, 2004; Carment, 
2003; Carment, Landry, Samy, & Shaw, 2015; Messner et al., 2015; Messner et al., 2016; 
Fritz, 2004; Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2000). Using state performance to define 
functioning states is prone to tautological reasoning (cf. Soifer, 2008; Cingolani, 2013; 
Lindvall & Teorell, 2017). For instance, the OECD 2015 Report on State Fragility claims 
that fragile states lag behind other states in reaching the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG; see The Development Assistance Committee, 2015). At the same time, it 
uses economic growth, educational years, and health capacities among others as 
indicators for state fragility. 
Functional understandings are not only analytically flawed; tautological reasoning 
also leads to bad policy advice, since we have no clue about the causal chain if we use 
poverty as an indicator for state fragility and then argue that state fragility causes 
poverty (for a thorough critique of the “failed state” concept see also Woodward, 2017). 
Fighting poverty is not the same as state-building. Nor does the strengthening of state 
institutions necessarily reduce poverty. 
A related issue is the confusion of definitional issues and research questions. If we 
define a state through the functions it performs, a non-performing state is no longer 
a state at all, strictly speaking. Moreover, defining rule of law or transparent, 
accountable and inclusive institutions as state functions tends to conflate regime type 
(democracy, autocracy etc.) and statehood. Functional, performance-oriented 
conceptualisations of the state prevent us from posing the questions that are relevant 
for our project: under which conditions do states or other types of polities perform 
well by providing rule structures and delivering goods and services? How much 
statehood is necessary to avoid governance breakdown and violent conflict? To what 
extent can non-state actors provide collective goods and services, compensating for 
the governance failure of states? 
Last but not least, most functional typologies in the literature and datasets on fragile 
states, failing states or ‘states at risk,’ reveal a normative orientation toward highly 
developed and democratic states. The benchmark is usually the democratic and 
capitalist state governed by the rule of law (Leibfried & Zürn, 2005). This is 
normatively questionable, because it reflects Eurocentrism and a bias toward Western 
concepts, as if statehood equals Western liberal statehood and a market economy. We 
might find the political and economic systems of North Korea, Iran, Angola, Saudi 
Arabia, or Russia morally questionable, but they certainly constitute states. 
The second understanding of state is institutional and conceptualizes a state as a 
particular type of organizational structure. Following Max Weber (Weber, 1978, 54), a 
state constitutes an authoritative rule structure, a Herrschaftsverband, which has the 
capacity to rule hierarchically, based on the control over the use of violence and can 
expect obedience to its commands. This is an institutional understanding of the state 
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as a hierarchical rule structure. It does not imply that states rule hierarchically via 
command and control all the time, only that statehood implies the ability to do so.  
Among contemporary authors, Fukuyama, Holsti, Jackson, and Krasner share this 
institutionalist understanding of statehood (see Fukuyama, 2004, 2012; Holsti, 2004; 
Jackson, 1990; Krasner, 1999). Equally important, this institutional understanding 
conforms to international law, in particular the Montevideo Convention of 1933 (see 
Grant, 1998-1999; also Jellinek, 1900 (1922)). Accordingly, a state must possess a 
permanent population, occupy a clearly defined territory, operate an effective 
government over its territory, and must display capacity to fulfil international treaty 
obligations. Weber’s conceptualisation of the state conforms to the third and fourth 
criteria mentioned here, if we understand ‘effective government’ as entailing some 
degree of hierarchical enforcement capacity, what we call statehood. States command 
what Stephen Krasner calls “domestic sovereignty,” i.e., “the formal organization of 
political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise 
effective control within the borders of their own polity” (Krasner, 1999, 4). The control 
of the monopoly over the use of force captures the coercive or military dimension of 
state capacity (Gurr, 1988; Fortin, 2010). The setting and enforcement of rules requires 
some tax and spending capacity (Tilly, 1995) as well as some sort of administration or 
professional bureaucracy (Skocpol, 1985; Rauch & Evans, 2000).  
The Weberian understanding of statehood allows us to strictly distinguish between 
the state as an institutional structure of authority that can set and enforce rules and 
controls the monopoly over the use of force, on the one hand, and the kind of 
governance it provides, on the other. The latter is an empirical not a definitional 
question. Statehood, understood as the capacity to govern hierarchically, is part of the 
definition. Whether statehood is used to provide collective goods and services, forms 
part of the research question. Likewise, statehood has nothing to do with regime type 
(democracy, autocracy, etc.) or what North et al. call “open” versus “closed access 
orders” (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009). Rather, democracy and rule of law are 
institutions that may affect the effectiveness and legitimacy of collective goods and 
service provision. 
Separating statehood from governance avoids the fallacies of functional 
conceptualisations. Most importantly, such separation allows for the possibility that 
actors other than the state engage in governance. What if non-state actors, such as 
warlords or rebel groups, gain the ability to maintain a monopoly over the means of 
violence in a territory controlled by them and are also capable of enforcing their 
decisions? As Tilly has argued, the European states came about precisely because such 
violent non-state actors acquired what has been defined as statehood above (Tilly, 
1975, 1985). In the contemporary international system, however, the difference 
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between a state in the above sense and a territory controlled by warlords, rebel groups, 
or multinational companies is (international) recognition. 
2.2 Areas of Limited Statehood 
The institutional understanding of the state enables us to define more precisely what 
limited statehood means. While areas of limited statehood located inside 
internationally recognized states, it is the domestic sovereignty of these states, which 
is severely circumscribed. Areas of limited statehood then constitute those parts of a 
country 
in which central authorities (national governments) lack the ability to 
implement and enforce central rules and decisions and/or in which they do 
not control the means of violence.   
The ability to set and enforce rules or to control the means of violence can be limited 
along various dimensions: 1) territorial, i.e., parts of a country’s territorial spaces; 2) 
sectoral, that is, with regard to specific policy areas; 3) social, i.e., with regard to 
specific parts of the population; and 4) temporal (see figure 2 below). The opposite of 
limited statehood is not ‘unlimited’ but ‘consolidated’ statehood, i.e. those areas 
(functional or geographic) of a country in which the state enjoys the monopoly over 
the means of violence and/or the ability to make and enforce central decisions most 
of the time. 
 
Figure 2: Configurations of Limited Statehood (Examples) 
DIMENSIONS OF LIMITED 
STATEHOOD 
AREAS OF LIMITED STATEHOOD 
(EXAMPLES) 
Territory 
Amazon region (Brazil) 
Most Sub-Saharan African countries 
Policy area 
Environment (China) 
Health (South Africa) 
Social 
Mafia (Italy) 
Al Qaeda and Daesh (Middle East) 
Temporal Hurricane Katrina (U.S.) 
Source: Authors’ own illustration. 
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Consolidated statehood is the exception to the rule in the contemporary international 
system covering mostly the “global North” of highly industrialized and democratic 
states. This is not to argue that areas of limited statehood are confined to the “global 
South” of the developing world. New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina became an 
area of limited statehood temporarily when the U.S. state lost the monopoly over the 
means of violence for a short period. The ‘no go’ areas in many American or European 
inner cities have to be mentioned, too. Nevertheless, consolidated states – the 
‘Denmarks’ of the world – approximate the Weberian ideal type of state at one end of 
the spectrum. 
At the other end of the continuum, we find ‘failed states’, i.e., countries where areas of 
limited statehood cover the entire territory and most of the population in most policy 
areas most of the time. Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Yemen, 
Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan constitute prominent examples of ‘failed states’ in the 
current international system.3 Somalia is an interesting case insofar as it contains at 
least one province – Somaliland, which has developed into a quasi-state. While not 
recognised internationally as a state, Somaliland nevertheless exhibits a provincial 
government with almost complete domestic sovereignty (Bryden, 2004; Debiel, 
Glassner, Schetter, & Terlinden, 2009; Menkhaus, 2006/2007; Renders & Terlinden, 
2010). Yet, Somalia is usually portrayed as the quintessential failed state – a reminder 
of the pitfalls of “methodological nationalism” (Amelina, Nergiz, Faist, & Schiller, 
2012; Wimmer & Schiller, 2003; Zürn, 2002). 
Focusing on areas of limited statehood rather than entire ‘failing’ or ‘failed’ states 
provides for a more nuanced picture on governance, even though it may be more 
difficult to obtain data. Measuring areas of limited statehood in a valid and reliable 
way represents a daunting task (see Stollenwerk, 2018 for the following). First, most 
datasets suffer from methodological nationalism, which contradicts our 
configurative understanding of areas of limited statehood and the reality in most 
countries. Second, as argued above, many datasets on ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ states conflate 
degrees of statehood with measurements of governance and service provision. Third, 
many datasets (such as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index)4 are based on 
subjective expert estimates rather than ‘objective’ measurements. Fourth, measuring 
areas of limited statehood faces endogeneity issues. Our conceptualisation of limited 
statehood emphasises lack of state capacity to implement and enforce decisions. But 
what if weak state capacity results from deliberate choices by political, economic, and 
social elites? On the one hand, there are ‘neoliberal’ states which have voluntarily 
                                                          
3  Note that our definition of failed states only pertains to the lack of monopoly over the means of violence and the 
missing capacity to implement and enforce government decisions. Thus, it differs from the way in which failed 
statehood is conceptualised in most of the literature (see above). 
4  See https://www.bti-project.org/de/startseite/ (last accessed April 24, 2017). 
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withdrawn from regulating particular policy areas (e.g. capital flows) or from 
providing particular public services (e.g. telecommunications) and, thus, have ceased 
to maintain the institutional capacity to set and enforce central rules and decisions in 
these issue areas. On the other hand, there are the so-called “cunning” states 
(Randeria, 2003; see also Brandel & Randeria, 2018) whereby political and social elites 
deliberately keep state institutions weak in order to reap economic and political 
benefits or to increase their rents (see also Reno, 1998; also Bates, 2008).  
Irrespective of measurement issues, there can be no doubt that areas of limited 
statehood are a pervasive feature of Europe’s geostrategic environment and will 
remain so for the foreseeable future. They have existed in Europe’s surroundings for 
such a long time that they can no longer be seen as contingencies (examples include 
the frozen conflicts in the Western Balkans, Moldova, Georgia, Lebanon, Somalia, 
Morocco/Western Sahara or Israel/Palestine). In addition, the phenomenon of limited 
statehood has expanded considerably, so much so that nowadays there is hardly a 
country among Europe’s neighbouring states and in the regions adjacent to them that 
does not have to deal with it. Areas of limited statehood exist within parts of otherwise 
reasonably functioning states (e.g. Southern Ossetia in Georgia and Sinai in Egypt), 
cover virtually the territory of an entire state (e.g. Iraq, Syria, Libya), or extend over 
potentially vast cross-border areas (e.g. the Sahel). Finally, areas of limited statehood 
in more distant regions – from the Sahel and the Horn of Africa to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan – pose relevant risks to European security given the increasingly 
transnational character and interconnections between regions of the world. Physical 
proximity still matters, but increasingly porous borders, miniaturisation of 
technology and the interconnectedness of threats (organised crime, terrorism, and 
other non-state violent actors) make physical distances less relevant to intra-EU 
security. 
2.3 Contested Orders 
Like areas of limited statehood, order contestations per se do not threaten the stability 
of political systems or the ability and action capacity of states to pursue their foreign 
and security policies protecting their citizens and realising their various goals and 
interests. A certain degree of contestation and politicisation is constitutive, 
particularly for liberal polities. For instance, (mostly) right-wing anti-establishment 
parties across Europe have started contesting the institutional setup of the EU 
through a process of politicisation (De Wilde, Leupold, & Schmidtke, 2016; Zürn, 2012). 
While this puts EU institutions under stress, it does not threaten the European order 
per se, let alone pose security threats. European polities have always had to deal with 
so-called ‘anti-system’ political parties and social movements (Capoccia, 2002). 
Likewise, non-liberal societies have faced competing conceptions about appropriate 
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political, economic, social, and territorial orders. Contested orders can then be 
conceptualised as  
incompatibilities between two or more competing views about how political, 
economic, social and territorial order should be established and/or sustained. 
Order contestations might relate to already existing governance systems and polities 
(e.g. the rise of populist parties and movements in the EU or the challenges to the 
international liberal order by both the Trump administration and the Chinese 
leadership). Orders can also be contested in situations where actors compete to 
establish their own sets of rules, e.g. the EU-Russian competition over region-building 
in the Eastern neighbourhood. Order contestations always involve competing ideas 
and discourses about what is considered an appropriate political, economic, or social 
system. A prominent example concerns the controversy over violence between 
Sufism and Salafi Jihadism. 
Contested orders often involve a configuration of actors, in which some challenge the 
legitimacy of the “rules of the game” and of political institutions. Of course, such 
contestations do not only relate to domestic and national polities, but also to regional 
and international orders. Russia’s challenge to the European post-Cold War 
arrangement through the annexation of the Crimea or the Trump administration’s 
contestation of a global rule-based trade order are cases in point. As contestation is 
fairly normal in contemporary political systems, political regimes have developed 
different mechanisms to deal with them. While democratic polities rely on 
institutionalised deliberation, majority decisions and accountability, non-democratic 
systems use co-optation and repression (North et al., 2009; Fukuyama, 2012). Regional 
and global governance systems have also developed various mechanisms to deal with 
contestations, e.g. through dispute settlement systems.  
Things start to change when the legitimacy of an existing order becomes so contested 
that the competition for political power can no longer be contained by the normal 
mechanisms of political systems, be they liberal or not, or where the very existence of 
the state-based international order is attacked, e.g. by radical religious movements 
such as Jihadist Islamist forces (Mendelsohn, 2012), but also by revisionist powers, 
such as Russia in its “near abroad”. In such cases, order contestations are conducted in 
an increasingly hostile or even violent manner resulting in terrorism, violent 
insurgencies, or outright wars that destabilise a country or an entire region. Violent 
actors do not only contest domestic orders internally, as in the cases of Egypt, Jordan, 
and Lebanon. Alternative or competing ideas and ideologies are also aggressively 
promoted transnationally by external actors, including Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and 
Salafi-Takfiri Islamist organisations (such as IS/Daesh, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). In these cases, domestic order contestations become 
increasingly entangled with geopolitical rivalries among regional and global players 
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in the EU’s surroundings. Russia’s attempts at securing an exclusive sphere of 
influence in Eastern Europe by contesting the liberal underpinnings of Europe’s post-
Cold War security architecture, culminating in the annexation of Crimea, the 
destabilization of Ukraine, and the de facto annexation of parts of the Georgian 
territory, are only one example. This behaviour is mirrored in the Southern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East by the regional rivalries between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, or the presence of Salafi-Takfiri 
organizations striving to establish caliphates in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and the wider Sahel. 
These developments impact intra-EU security directly, as evidenced by both the 
European Foreign Fighters phenomenon and IS/Daesh-inspired attacks in, among 
others, Paris, Brussels, and Berlin. 
2.4 The Interplay Between Areas of Limited Statehood and Contested Orders  
Limited statehood and contested orders represent the two risks Europe faces in its 
Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods. Order contestations interact with areas of 
limited statehood in various ways. If the state is too weak to enforce rules and 
regulations, it is often hard to contain order contestations within the institutional 
framework of the state. Areas of limited statehood with reduced public service 
provision often invite local, regional, and global actors in to take over such provisions. 
This increases the risk of fragmenting societies along ethnic, religious, and 
ideological lines, thereby undermining social cohesion and trust as well as opening 
an arena for regional actors to support local actors along these lines, further 
increasing social and political fragmentation. As a result, the interaction between 
contested orders and limited statehood bears the risk of governance breakdowns and 
violent conflicts, when the institutional structures are lacking to contain conflicts and 
manage them in peaceful ways. These risks are exacerbated, the more external actors 
– state and non-state – intermingle in the internal affairs of countries with areas of 
limited statehood further adding to the fuel of order contestations. Lebanon and the 
rival coalitions between Hezbollah, Assad’s regime in Syria and Iran, on the one hand, 
and Sunni forces supported by Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Gulf states, on the other 
hand, provide prominent examples. Russia’s interferences in Eastern Ukraine, South 
Ossetia, or Abkhazia are other cases in point. Conversely, order contestations along 
ethnic, religious or ideological lines can (further) weaken statehood. Sectarian and 
ethnic politics undermines the capacity of state institutions to provide collective 
goods and services and their control over the use of force. Overthrowing the 
dictatorship of Muammar al-Gaddafi turned Libya from a ‘rough’ state into a largely 
‘failed’ state with at least two war lords competing for power.  
Overall, the interactions between order contestations and areas of limited statehood 
are still poorly understood, and EU-LISTCO’s research will particularly focus on these 
inter-linkages. 
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Finally, there are also direct effects of order contestations on the EU and its member 
states themselves. Russia’s contestation of the Western-led, rule-based post-Cold War 
order and the terrorist attacks of Islamist groups do not only threaten peace and 
security in the EU’s (extended) surroundings. They provide anti-establishment 
groups within the EU with alternative narratives (Russia) and a pretext (Islamic 
terrorism) to contest core liberal values around which the societies of its member 
states are organized and upon which the European integration project is built, such as 
cosmopolitanism, liberalism, and religious tolerance. Contestations of Europe’s 
liberal order in Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, or the UK 
have not turned violent. However, they undermine the EU’s preparedness for dealing 
with the threats of areas of limited statehood and contested orders when they 
deteriorate into governance breakdown and violent conflict.  
3. FROM RISKS TO THREATS 
3.1 Governance Breakdown and Violent Conflict 
As argued above, EU-LISTCO starts from the assumption that limited statehood and 
contested orders are universal phenomena, which do not pose security threats to the 
EU in themselves. Our main research challenge ahead is to identify the conditions 
under which areas of limited statehood and contested orders deteriorate into 
governance breakdown and violent conflict, posing severe threats to the EU that go 
beyond conventional geopolitical challenges. Such is the case when deficits in the 
capacity of states to set and enforce rules become extremely severe and are not 
compensated by the efforts of other (e.g. non-state or international) actors. This might 
then result in an overall breakdown of governance, which implies a substantial under-
provision of basic public goods and services. For example, an Ebola outbreak does not 
constitute a substantial security threat to the EU in itself. Only if affected states (and 
regional and international organizations) in Africa are unable to contain and 
neutralise the disease which then produces a severe governance-breakdown, as it did 
in West Africa in 2014, does the outbreak threaten the security and stability of the 
region with serious implications for the EU. Areas of limited statehood also face 
governance breakdown when the state monopoly over the means of violence is not 
only compromised, but a multiplicity of violent non-state actors compete with state 
actors over controlling the territory. 
Contested orders turn violent if domestic conflicts over “good public order” 
undermine the legitimacy of a regime to an extent that it loses support of key parts of 
society and relies on repression of dissent to set and enforce its rule. This may 
eventually trigger violent opposition by those political forces that seek to establish a 
different order, resulting in popular uprisings or civil war. 
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In sum, indicators for governance breakdown and violent conflict are instances in which 
• state, non-state and external/international actors do not provide public goods and 
services (anymore), and/or 
• multiple violent non-state actors fight with state actors or among themselves over 
the control over territory, and/or 
• conflicts about domestic/international order turn violent, and/or 
• global, diffuse, and regional threats act as multipliers for governance breakdowns 
and violence. 
Before we discuss the tipping points in the following, however, we need to introduce 
the concept of governance in order to be able to identify both effective governance 
and governance breakdown. 
3.1.1 Governance 
The concept of governance has made quite a career in the social sciences during the 
1990s and the 2000s. There is a growing number of handbooks, edited volumes, special 
issues, and research centres that are dedicated to global, transnational, multi-level, 
new, or experimental governance (Bevir, 2011; Levi-Faur, 2012b; Hale & Held, 2011; 
Schuppert & Zürn, 2008; Enderlein, Wälti, & Zürn, 2010; Mayntz, 2009; Pierre & Peters, 
2000; Zürn, 2013). 
In its most general definition, governance refers to all modes of coordinating social 
action in human society. However, such a broad understanding that identifies 
governance with any kind of social ordering does not appear useful for our purposes 
here. After all, we are not interested in how markets allocate values and resources. Nor 
are we concerned with how families deal with conflicts. Rather, we want to know how 
collective goods and services can be provided in the absence of a well-functioning 
state. In other words, we are interested in politics as the regulation of public affairs 
for a society. This involves finding out “who gets what, when, how?,” to quote Harold 
Laswell (Laswell, 1936) in what David Easton defined as the “(authoritative) allocation 
of values for a society” (Easton, 1953, 131).5 As a result, we employ a somewhat narrower 
concept which situates governance in the context of politics. By governance, we mean  
institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement 
collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods.  
This conceptualization follows closely the understanding of governance that is 
widespread within political science, law, and international relations (see e.g. Mayntz, 
2004, 2008; Kohler-Koch, 1998; Benz, 2004; Schuppert, 2005; Schuppert & Zürn, 2008). 
Simply curbing negative externalities of private goods’ production does not qualify 
                                                          
5  We put “authoritative” in parenthesis here, since it should not be conflated with hierarchical. For a discussion see 
Czempiel, 1981. 
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as governance in our understanding (while setting up rules to avoid negative 
externalities does). We distinguish three types of governance contributions: 
• The direct delivery of collective goods and services (first-order governance), such 
as security, public health, education, and clean environment. We follow the usual 
definition of collective goods as characterised by non-exclusive access and/or non-
rivalry in consumption (see Héritier, 2002). At least one of these conditions must 
be present for a good to qualify as collective or common. 
• The formulation and implementation of collectively binding rules for regulating 
social life (e.g. human rights) as well as the delivery of collective goods and 
services (second-order governance); 
• The establishment of institutions regulating the rule-making itself and 
coordinating the governance contributions of others (meta-governance). 
Research on governance usually distinguishes three different types of 
institutionalised rule structures: hierarchy (states), market (competition systems), 
and networks (negotiation systems, such as associations or public-private 
partnerships; see overviews in Levi-Faur, 2012a). Hierarchy constitute the essence of 
the (Western) nation-state. It provides a structure of rule and authority that enables 
and legitimates state actors to hierarchically set and enforce central decisions.  
Conditions in areas of limited statehood are profoundly different. While states still 
exist as hierarchical rule structures, governance cannot rely on states’ capacity to set 
and enforce central rules or provide collective goods and services directly. We have to 
look for functional equivalents to modern statehood (see Draude, 2007 on this point). 
Governance with/out the state in areas of limited statehood relies on combinations of 
state and non-state actors governing areas of limited statehood. State actors include 
national governments (the ‘central state’), foreign governments and their agencies 
(e.g. development agencies), as well as international (inter-state) organizations (IOs) 
such as the UN, its agencies, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF; see Lederer, 2018 for details). Non-state actors comprise a whole variety of actors, 
such as companies and other for-profit organizations (Börzel & Deitelhoff, 2018), 
(international) non-governmental organizations ((I)NGOs), multi-stakeholder 
partnerships (e.g. the Forest Stewardship Council, overview in Beisheim, Ellersiek, & 
Lorch, 2018), local “traditional” authorities, such as tribal and religious leaders 
(Förster & Koechlin, 2018), and even violent or criminal non-state actors such as 
warlords or rebel groups (Berti, 2018).  
The multitude of governors in areas of limited statehood blurs the distinction 
between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ realms which is constitutive for modern statehood 
in its Western and Eurocentric understandings (Kumar, 1997). What does this mean in 
countries in which state institutions are so weak that government actors can easily 
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exploit state resources for private purposes, while so-called ‘private’ actors, such as 
companies, provide much-needed collective goods with regard to education, public 
health, or infrastructure (Börzel & Thauer, 2013a; Thauer, 2014)? In many cases, rent-
seeking governments distribute state revenues, including development aid, to 
maintain their rule via clientelistic networks (the so-called “neo-patrimonial state” in 
sub-Saharan Africa, the Southern Caucasus, and elsewhere, see Erdmann & Engel, 
2007; Erdmann, 2013). 
We now turn to a discussion of the factors determining the tipping points, which 
determine whether or not areas of limited statehood and contested orders turn into 
governance breakdowns and contested orders. 
3.2 Tipping Points: Risks and Resilience 
EU-LISTCO examines the conditions under which Europe’s risks turn into threats and 
tries to identify the tipping points through risk scanning and foresight activities 
combined with comparative case studies. In other words, we need to clearly 
distinguish between various risks that have the potential to negatively affect 
European security, on the one hand, and the tipping points turning these latent risks 
into manifest threats. Only then can we determine in cooperation with the EEAS and 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs of selected member states what the EU and its member 
states can do to both prevent areas of limited statehood and contested orders from 
lapsing into governance breakdown and violent conflict and to foster resilience and 
better governance in areas of limited statehood and contested orders. 
A thorough assessment of the security risks which the EU faces in its surroundings 
and on a global scale requires us to examine the sub-national and transnational levels 
and to identify the causal mechanisms through which the ubiquitous conditions of 
limited statehood and contested orders deteriorate into governance breakdown and 
violent conflict. Such an approach also allows us to identify remedies and make policy 
recommendations as to how the EU and its member states can foster resilience in 
areas of limited statehood and contested orders. 
We hypothesise that tipping points are affected by two factors, which work in opposite 
directions, namely global, diffuse as well as regional risks, on the one hand, as well as 
resilience leading to effective and legitimate governance, on the other (see figure 4 
below). In other words, effective and legitimate governance fostered by resilient 
societies can mitigate the effects of various global or regional risks thereby 
preventing governance breakdowns and violent conflict. It will be subject of EU-
LISTCO’s empirical research to determine the precise interactions between threats, 
resilience, and governance and their effects on tipping points. 
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Figure 3: Explaining Tipping Points 
 
Source: Authors’ own illustration. 
3.2.1 Risks 
EU-LISTCO distinguishes between various global, diffuse, and regional risks (see: 
D3.1: Contribution to the EU-LISTCO conceptual framework). Global, diffuse, and 
regional risks can originate from particular actors and countries inside and outside 
of Europe’s immediate proximity. Such risks can then affect tipping points leading to 
governance breakdown and/or violent conflict in Europe’s immediate neighbouring 
regions, in North Africa, the Middle East, or Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, as the 
ongoing crises in Eastern Ukraine or Libya illustrate. Such governance breakdowns 
and/or violent conflict in Europe’s neighbouring regions constitute what we identify 
as threats to European security. In contrast, governance breakdown and/or violent 
conflict in regions further away, such as Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Sahel or other 
parts of Sub-Sahara Africa, but also East Asia, would be what we call “global” risks for 
European security. Such cases might turn into threats either through spill-over effects 
in Europe’s direct Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods (governance 
breakdown/violent conflict) or through direct repercussions for European security, 
for example by fuelling radicalization. However, it is important to strictly distinguish 
between risks and threats under these circumstances. Not every governance 
breakdown anywhere in the world poses a threat to European security. EU-LISTCO’s 
research needs to identify the tipping points when these risks turn into threats rather 
than assuming that a ubiquity of threats to European security. 
The same holds true for other global risks. For example, North Korea’s nuclear build-
up or the territorial conflicts in the South China Sea certainly affect Europe directly. 
But they only turn into threats to European security if they result in violent conflict 
in East Asia which then massively disrupts Europe’s main maritime trading routes.  
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Diffuse risks are not geographically contingent and often hard to ascribe to particular 
actors. Examples are climate change and particular types of cyber threats. Climate 
change, for example, is not a direct threat to most parts of Europe as such, but its 
current effects already spark governance breakdown and violent conflict in areas that 
are important to Europe, and, thus, become regional or global threats. Some kinds of 
cyber risks, such as runaway malware originally intended for very specific, targeted 
espionage or criminal operations (Wannacry, Petya/NotPetya), can equally turn into 
threats with enormous economic or physical security impact without a clear source. 
3.2.2 Resilience 
What are the pre-conditions of good and effective governance at the various levels? 
Here, EU-LISTCO focuses on the concept of resilience which figures prominently in 
the 2016 EU Global Strategy:  
“It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to 
the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. Fragility 
beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By contrast, resilience – the 
ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from 
internal and external crises – benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions, 
sowing the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies. Together with its 
partners, the EU will therefore promote resilience in its surrounding regions. A 
resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy. But 
the reverse holds true as well. To ensure sustainable security, it is not only state 
institutions that we will support. Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, 
resilience is a broader concept, encompassing all individuals and the whole of society. 
A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable 
development lies at the heart of a resilient state.” (High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016, 23-24; see also European Commission & 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2017). 
Thus, the Global Strategy conceives of resilience as an active and agency-driven 
process, which is in line with standard definitions, such as David Chandler’s who 
defines the concept as “the capacity to positively or successfully cope with, adapt to, 
and recover from security crises” (Chandler, 2017, 436). He describes resilience as an 
active process of coping with complexity, particularly with regard to “unknown 
unknowns” (Donald Rumsfeld) in various eco- as well as social systems (Chandler, 
2014). In this context, the geographers Keck and Sakdapolrak emphasise three 
features of social resilience (Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013, 5), namely 
• coping capacities as “the ability of social actors to cope with and overcome all kinds 
of adversities;” 
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• adaptive capacities as “their ability to learn from past experiences and adjust 
themselves to future challenges;” and 
• transformative capacities as “their ability to craft sets of institutions that foster 
individual welfare and sustainable societal robustness towards future crises.” 
While coping capacities are re-active in response to crises (see also Chandler above), 
adaptive and transformative capacities are pro-active and anticipatory strategies to 
deal with situations of medium and high challenges or risks. In our understanding of 
social resilience, we focus on the two latter capacities as agency-centred abilities to 
prevent risks from turning into threats. Note that resilience needs to be strictly 
distinguished from stability and stabilization as the preservation of political and 
social order in situations of crises and rapid change. Rather, resilience is itself 
transformative as well as adaptive and, thus, incorporates political and social changes 
(see Chandler, 2014; Zebrowski, 2013). A focus on resilience as adaptive and 
transformative capacities also overcomes the well-known “stability-democratization” 
(Jünemann, 2003) dilemma the EU faces and which is often used as an excuse to 
bolster repressive and autocratic regimes in the European Eastern and Southern 
neighbourhoods (Börzel, 2015; Babayan & Risse, 2016).  
Moreover, while the EU Global Strategy distinguishes between individual, societal, 
and state resilience, our focus is on resilience as a pre-condition for effective 
governance. The emphasis on governance rather than the state avoids the state-
centrism of other conceptualizations of resilience. We do not focus on state resilience, 
which can be easily misunderstood as the stabilization of authoritarian regimes. 
Three factors serve as indicators for resilience, namely social trust relationships, 
legitimacy of governors and governance institutions, as well as the design of 
governance institutions. Here, EU-LISTCO can draw on previous research showing 
under which conditions actors other than the state provide effective and legitimate 
governance in areas of limited statehood (Krasner & Risse, 2014b; Börzel & Risse, 
forthcoming). 
3.2.2.1 Social Trust 
“Trust is largely understood as a cooperative attitude towards other people based on 
the optimistic expectation that others are likely to respect one’s own interests” 
(Draude, Hölck, & Stolle, 2018, 354; see also Börzel & Risse, 2016). Luhmann has 
conceptualised trust as “upfront risk-taking” (riskante Vorleistung, Luhmann, 1989), 
that is, deliberately abstaining from checking whether my interaction partner tells 
the truth about not defecting or keeping her commitments. Relationships of trust 
induce a sense of appropriate behaviour among actors which is no longer based on 
cost-benefit calculations. 
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Three types of social trust can be distinguished (Börzel & Risse, 2016; Draude et al., 
2018): First, personalised trust among people living in the same neighbourhood or 
community who trust each other because they know each other; personalised trust 
develops out of face-to-face interactions. Personalized trust has been found to be a 
functional equivalent for weak or dysfunctional state institutions in areas of limited 
statehood and, thus, helps to explain the governance puzzle. It is endogenous to 
neighbourhoods and local communities where people know and trust each other. 
Personalised trust contributes to the effective provision of governance in the absence 
of functioning state institutions in at least two ways. To begin with and as mentioned 
above, personalized trust enables actors to solve local collective action problems 
(Gambetta, 1988). Elinor Ostrom demonstrated through experimental designs that 
local communities where members trust each other are likely to produce common 
pool resources without having to refer to strong institutions with their monitoring 
and sanctioning mechanisms (Ostrom, 1990, 2002; Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). 
Personalised trust, thus, enhances the action capacity of local communities.  
The presence or absence of local trust helps account for the variation in effective 
governance in areas of limited statehood. At the same time, its governance potential 
remains limited to neighbourhoods and local communities (Sampson, 2012; 
Sutherland, Brunton-Smith, & Jackson, 2013). Public goods and service provison more 
often than not requires governance beyond the neighbourhood. Not only are local 
resources too limited to provide complex collective goods and services, such as health, 
education, and infrastructure. Many collective goods problems, such as 
environmental pollution or pandemics, have to be addressed on a larger scale to be 
effectively solved.  
Second, scaling-up governance in the absence of functional and effective state 
institutions requires the extension of trust to people not personally known. A first 
step is trusting strangers because they are members of the same social group based 
on kinship, a shared ethnic background, faith, values, common history or language, 
geographical proximity, or behavioural similarities (Brewer, 1981; Tanis & Postmes, 
2005). This group-based or particularistic trust may generate what Putnam calls 
“bonding social capital” (Putnam, 2000: 22). It enables groups to cooperate more 
effectively and to provide collective goods and services, at least for group members 
and greatly beyond personalised networks.  
However, group-based or particularistic trust can also hinder the upscaling of 
governance. Social groups do not have to use their trust to engage in governance. 
Criminal networks such as the mafia are built on relationships of trust, too (Stolle & 
Rochon, 1998; Portes, 1998: 15-18). Moreover, if a group only encompasses parts of a 
society, group-based trust produces at best club goods whose consumption is confined 
to the members of the group. At worst, it undermines rather than advances 
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governance altogether (Putnam, 1995: 665). Group-based trust might foster in-group 
favouritism (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006) and reinforce in-group/outgroup divisions. 
This is particularly relevant for areas of limited statehood which are often socially 
heterogeneous post-conflict societies with deep cultural- or identity-based cleavages. 
Third, upscaling governance in areas of limited statehood beyond “islands of 
excellence” (Krasner, 2018) in local communities ultimately requires some degree of 
generalised trust in “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991). People who trust each 
other irrespective of personal relationships, shared kinship, or common religious 
beliefs are prepared to pay a price for their loyalty (e.g., paying taxes), to cooperate 
with the governance institutions, and to comply with costly rules (Putnam, 1993; 
Putnam, 2000; Rothstein & Stolle, 2003; Draude et al., 2018). 
But how is generalised trust possible in areas of limited statehood that are 
characterised by social and cultural heterogeneity and strong cleavages? We suggest 
two causal mechanisms, one for the generalization of group-based trust through the 
inclusiveness of social identities and the other for the building of generalised trust 
through the impartiality of institutions. To begin with, whether or not group-based 
trust leads to generalized trust furthering better governance and the provision of 
public goods and services in areas of limited statehood and beyond depends crucially 
on the social construction of the group identity itself. According to Social Identity 
Theory, people that share a strong sense of group identity cooperate more within their 
group than with outsiders (Tajfel, 1974). Group identities can be more or less inclusive 
and accommodating to strangers. The more inclusive a group identity is, the more 
easily it can be extended to encompass other groups. Once in-group trust is built, it 
makes the generalisation of trust more likely when combined with inclusive 
identities, which allow for the emergence of multiple, overlapping communities. 
The second mechanism relies on formal political, administrative and legal 
institutions (Braithwaite & Levi, 1998; Levi & Stoker, 2000; Hartmann, 2011; Rothstein 
& Stolle, 2008; Herreros, 2012). More precisely, it is the local practices of 
administrative or executive agents that matter. The practices of local police, judges, 
teachers, or doctors signal to people the moral standards of society. If they perform 
their governance functions effectively and impartially, people will infer from their 
experience to the behaviour of others. These arguments resonate with studies on 
procedural fairness, which show that actors comply even with costly rules and 
regulations because they believe that those have been adopted “in accordance with 
right process” (Franck, 1990: 706) and procedures that are fair and just (Tyler, 2006). 
The more their governance services are provided in an impartial and procedurally fair 
way, the more they help in generating and maintaining generalized trust as an 
enabling condition for the up-scaling of governance – even in the absence of 
functioning state institutions. In other words, there seems to be a causal pathway 
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from the perception of inclusive, transparent and fair institutions to the emergence 
of generalised trust as a major factor for enhancing effective governance. 
EU-LISTCO will research in particular how the EU can foster generalised trust in its 
Eastern and Southern neighbourhood through its various policies and instruments. 
We will also look at regional as well as international attempts to overcome challenges 
to generalised trust and collective action. 
3.2.2.2 Empirical Legitimacy or Social Acceptance 
The second indicator for resilience is legitimacy. In most general terms, legitimacy 
refers to the “right to rule” (Weber, 1978) or the “license to govern” (cf. Gehman, 
Lefsrud, & Fast, 2017). The literature distinguishes between normative, legal, and 
empirical legitimacy. While a normative perspective assesses whether an actor or 
institution should have the right to govern according to various normative principles 
(Schmelzle, 2015), a legal perspective considers whether the actor or institution is 
legitimate from a formal legal point of view (see Tyler, 1997; Hollis, 2002).  
In contrast, we focus on empirical legitimacy as social acceptance. We define the 
empirical legitimacy of governance actors and institutions as a given social group’s 
or population’s sense of obligation or willingness to accept their authority. This 
conceptualisation not only allows for considering the legitimacy of the state but also 
of external and non-state actors. Note that social acceptance or empirical legitimacy 
tells us very little about the normative or legal status of governors or institutions. The 
so-called Islamic State (IS) is certainly not a legitimate actor according to 
international law, and its normative legitimacy is surely extremely questionable. 
Nevertheless, it has enjoyed at least empirical legitimacy amongst its members and 
some supporters (Fromson & Simon, 2015). . 
There is a huge literature on the legitimacy of transnational governance (see e.g. 
Hurd, 1999; Benz & Papadopoulos, 2006; Clark, 2005; Dingwerth, 2007; Risse, 2006; 
March & Olsen, 1998; Zürn, 2000; Schmelzle, 2011). Social acceptance of the governors 
and of the governance institutions by those being governed constitutes a crucial 
condition for the effectiveness of governance itself. It is rather unlikely that effective 
governance can be achieved if the governors do not enjoy a ‘license to govern’ and if 
the governance institutions are not considered legitimate by the population or the 
local elites. As argued above, diffuse support for the governors and the governance 
institutions leads to voluntary compliance with costly rules and to cooperative 
attitudes with regard to service delivery. Both are crucial in areas of limited statehood 
where the state lacks enforcement capacities. 
This brings us to the various sources of legitimacy. First, output legitimacy derives 
from the level of performance of actors and is, thus, directly related to effectiveness. 
In this context, a virtuous circle might evolve over time in which the initial 
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performance meets the expectations of local communities which then increases the 
governance legitimacy and, hence, its effectiveness (see Schmelzle & Stollenwerk, 
forthcoming for a discussion). Here, governance effectiveness feeds back into 
legitimacy. 
Second, input as well as throughput legitimacy can be generated by designing inclusive 
governance institutions as discussed above. The development community uses the 
terms “ownership” or “stakeholder” principles (Fukuda-Parr & Lopes, 2013; Theisohn 
& Lopes, 2013; Fransen & Kolk, 2007). As argued above, external actors are more likely 
to enjoy input legitimacy and, hence, to be effective, if they are operating through 
inclusive institutional arrangements that were created through contracting rather 
than imposition.  
Third, “traditional,”6 moral, knowledge-based, or charismatic authority are rather 
common as sources of legitimacy in areas of limited statehood. For instance, (I)NGOs 
as governors in areas of limited statehood usually claim moral as well as knowledge-
based (epistemic) authority and, if they are perceived as such, they are likely to be 
effective in providing goods and services (Murdie, 2014; Murdie & Hicks, 2013; Lake, 
forthcoming). Similar claims with regard to “traditional” as well as moral authority 
can be made by local chiefs and tribal leaders as governors.  
In sum, empirical legitimacy appears to be a powerful indicator for resilience in areas 
of limited statehood, precisely because it should lead to rule-following and 
cooperation with the governors on the various local, national, regional, or global 
levels based on the logic of appropriateness rather than some cost-benefit 
calculations. As a result, the more the governors as well as the governance 
arrangements are considered legitimate by domestic as well as local elites and 
populations, the less statehood by state institutions is required to enforce governance 
and make it effective. 
3.2.2.3 Institutional Design 
According to a standard definition, institutions are “persistent and connected sets of 
rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain (as well as 
enable/B&R) activity, and shape expectations” (Keohane, 1989, 161). Here, we 
concentrate on political or governance institutions, that is, institutions designed for 
rule-making and/or the provision of public goods and service. First, governance 
institutions – from (non-state) judicial systems to educational institutions, public 
health governance etc. – must be “fit for purpose” in order to be effective. This is a 
straightforward functional argument which – in international relations – has been 
made by rationalist institutionalists (see e.g. the situation structure approach by Zürn, 
                                                          
6  We put “traditional” in parentheses because what counts as tradition is often a social construction, see Förster & 
Koechlin, 2018. 
 
Conceptual Framework: Fostering Resilience in Areas of Limited Statehood and Contested Orders 
Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse 
25 
EU-LISTCO Working Paper No. 1/ September 2018 
https://www.eu-listco.net 
1992 and Martin, 1992, as well as the argument about “rational design,” Koremenos, 
Lipson, & Snidal, 2001). A pure coordination problem requires a different institutional 
design as compared to coordination games with distributive consequences and a 
collaboration problem of the prisoners’ dilemma variety (see Stein, 1990 on these 
distinctions).  
For areas of limited statehood, enforcement appears to be the main problem. In the 
absence of a central authority, non-state actors should have a common interest in 
cooperating to provide collective goods and services. Yet, even though it may be in 
their best interest, they are likely to forgo cooperation because of the risks of being 
cheated. Peace-keeping missions face such a collective action dilemma. For instance, 
the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine,7 which consisted of representatives from 
Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE, brokered a peace plan in 2014. The conflict parties 
pledged to stop the use of violence. In January 2015, the cease-fire had completely 
collapsed because both sides were still better off without agreement than if one 
unilaterally defected to extend its control over territory. Institutions can help avoid 
this collective action dilemma by providing effective monitoring and sanctioning 
mechanisms.  
Not all governance problems in areas of limited statehood resemble a prisoners’ 
dilemma which can be solved by institutions with enforcement capacity. 
Institutionalised monitoring and sanctioning is not required for coordination games, 
nor do they help to tackle distribution problems. Pure coordination games are self-
enforcing once actors have reached an agreement that helps them avoid their least 
preferred outcome. The proliferation of governance actors often results in 
organisational overlap and competition over resources and influence. To avoid 
problems of ineffectiveness caused by complexity and fragmentation, the various 
agencies have an incentive to coordinate their activities by establishing joint 
institutions, coordinating activities, and agreeing on some division of labour among 
them (Gehring & Faude, 2014; Faude, 2014). Coordination becomes more challenging, 
however, when the costs are not equally distributed. Accessibility and security may 
vary across the area, or international organisations may not be prepared to have 
private donors interfere with their public mandate and claim coordination authority 
(Beisheim & Liese, 2014a, 205-208). Once a solution is found, no actor has an incentive 
to defect. The problem is to come to an agreement in the first place. Institutions can 
facilitate side-payments and issue-linkages which compensate agencies for the 
concessions they make.  
                                                          
7 The Trilateral Contact Group does not have an official website. For more information see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trilateral_Contact_Group_on_Ukraine. 
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Task complexity matters for coordination, too (Krasner & Risse, 2014a): Distributing 
anti-malaria bed nets or child immunisation are relatively simple tasks that require 
little coordination among actors and few repeated interventions. In contrast, 
combating and preventing HIV/AIDS is a hugely complex task that necessitates the 
coordination of at least the health and education sectors and requires repeated 
interventions over many years (Schäferhoff, 2014). Institutions governing these tasks 
must also have sufficient material and ideational (e.g. knowledge) resources to be able 
to perform their functions.  
Institutional designs must also be flexible as to be able to adapt to local circumstances. 
One problem with the EU’s democracy promotion efforts has been the “one size fits 
all” strategies and instruments which then lacked effectiveness because they failed to 
take into account that drivers and obstacles of democratisation processes differ 
significantly across countries (Börzel & Risse, 2009). Effective governance institutions 
require flexible process management (Beisheim, Liese, Jannetschek, & Sarre, 2014) 
and built-in capacities enabling organizational learning and change management.  
Irrespective of the type of problem and the degree of complexity they face, 
governance institutions have to be open, inclusive, fair, and transparent in order to be 
effective (Börzel and Risse forthcoming). In fact, inclusiveness, which fosters 
voluntary compliance, is probably even more important if the governance 
arrangements lack enforcement capacities, as is common in areas of limited 
statehood. The effectiveness of multi-stakeholder partnerships crucially depends on 
the ownership they build of their legally non-binding standards among those that 
shall adhere to them (Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2010; cf. Beisheim & Liese, 2014b; for a 
more critical view see Booth, 2012; Sjöstedt, 2013). Inclusiveness generates input 
legitimacy insofar as those being governed have a say in the decision-making 
processes. 
But what about the state as a governance institution? While the state is weak by 
definition in areas of limited statehood, it is not completely absent. To some extent, 
the design of governance institutions outside the state can compensate for its weak 
capacity. Yet, it goes without saying that any remaining capacity by the state comes 
in handy in areas of limited statehood, particularly when state actors are embedded 
in the governance institutions. First, the control of violence is often a basic 
precondition for non-state actors, such as multi-stakeholder partnerships or 
companies, to engage in governance in the first place (Beisheim, Liese, Janetschek, & 
Sarre, 2014; Börzel & Thauer, 2013b; Liese, Janetschek, & Sarre, 2014, 139-142). Second, 
even where other governors seek to fill the void left by the state, successful 
implementation often relies on some regulatory capacity of the state. Third, basic 
infrastructure and administrative organisation are necessary for governance actors 
to deliver services and broaden access. They require roads, ports, and airports for their 
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operations (Beisheim, Börzel, Genschel, & Zangl, 2011b; Beisheim, Liese, Janetschek, et 
al., 2014). Fourth, external and non-state actors are more likely to engage in 
governance in ALS if they can ‘partner’ with state actors instead of entirely taking over 
(Deitelhoff & Wolf, 2010; Börzel, Hönke, & Thauer, 2012; Beisheim, Börzel, Genschel, & 
Zangl, 2011a). This requires states to have a minimum capacity to engage with other 
actors (Börzel, 2009). Finally, state capacity is important to coordinate governance 
interventions by other actors. Rather than regulating, it is about orchestrating the 
multiplicity of governance contributions to make sure that they complement each 
other (Beisheim et al., 2011a).  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The analytical concepts discussed in this paper allow us to systematically approach a 
broad range of challenges for the EU’s external action and the foreign policies of its 
member states. First, the notion of limited statehood makes it possible to 
conceptualise challenges – ranging from conflict management to humanitarian 
intervention, from fighting illicit trafficking to terrorism, from providing 
development assistance to border controls – under a single framework, in line with 
the provisions of the EU Global Strategy (High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016). Likewise, the concept of contested orders 
enables us to analyse how and under what conditions ideological struggles over 
“good” political, economic and social organization turn violent and thus become 
security threats to the EU and its citizens. We are also able to examine in detail how 
global and diffuse threats, order contestations, and geopolitical interests as well as 
rivalries interact to drive the former into violent conflicts. 
Second, our framework helps in identifying areas which are threatened by 
governance breakdown and violent conflict, which can be situated at different levels 
(sub-national, national, transnational), and which are based on a complex 
understanding of space that can relate to territories, policy areas, or social groups. We 
thereby overcome limitations of state-centric conceptualisations of fragility and deal 
systematically with drivers of governance breakdown and violent conflict emanating 
from the lack of governance capacity of both state and non-state actors and/or the lack 
of legitimacy as well as their interaction effects.  
By identifying tipping points, we shall be able to support the EU and its member states 
in preventing areas of limited statehood from deteriorating into governance 
breakdown and violent conflict. In this context, we have introduced the concept of 
resilience as providing the capacity of communities and societies for good and 
effective governance even in the absence of consolidated statehood and the flexibility 
to adapt to challenges. We have argued that relationships of trust, social acceptance, 
and specific institutional conditions are good indicators for measuring resilience. 
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These concepts and their operationalisation allows EU-LISTCO not only to research 
resilience, but also to devise strategies and policies for the EU and its member states 
to contribute to governance in areas of limited statehood and of contested orders 
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